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College of Coastal Georgia Grads Contributing Mightily

Up for some good news? Take a look at our local economy.

It’s on a roll. Tourism is booming. Downtown Brunswick is hopping and looking sharp, with new businesses, renovated spaces and lots more foot traffic.

Serious entrepreneurship is happening downtown. And with the College of Coastal Georgia’s Lucas Center for Entrepreneurship off to a roaring start, one can’t help but think there’s much more to come.

Workers remain in short supply, but recent figures suggest that, at long last, the local labor force is beginning to grow. Glynn’s unemployment rate currently stands at 2.5 percent, below Georgia’s 2.9 percent and the nation’s 3.5 percent.

Five more reasons to be bullish on the local economy: Justin Henshaw, Maggie Hughes, James Laurens, Dylan Lukitsch and Olivia Pickering.

Over the past decade, the College of Coastal Georgia has been turning out some monster graduates who are making mighty contributions to our community. Many are nurses and teachers.  Justin, Maggie, James, Dylan and Olivia are graduates of CCGA’s School of Business.

Justin Henshaw is an entrepreneur extraordinaire. He started two businesses while attending the College of Coastal Georgia. The first was Island Sound. The second was Coasters, a food truck. Not bad for a kid in college.

Henshaw Companies now consists of Island Sound, four Fuse stores, two Jimmy Johns, two Smoothie Kings, one Salata and the Golden Isles Wedding Association. Mr. Henshaw is also about to roll out his – and Glynn County’s – first tech startup.

Maggie Hughes is the Partnership Manager with the Golden Isles CVB. Maggie is a real people person, poised and quick to smile. She is also grit personified, as folks who watched her play volleyball for the Mariners know well.

James Laurens is Associate Broker for Compass360 Realty, Inc.  James knows the Brunswick real estate market inside and out. He has renovated a historic property in downtown Brunswick and has another downtown project in the works. He’s also the Vice President of the Golden Isles Arts and Humanities Association.

Dylan Lukitsch is the Manager of Business Development and Economic Strategy with the Brunswick Downtown Development Authority. Not only is Dylan a top-flight researcher and number cruncher, he has become an expert on local taxation. His thesis for the University of Missouri’s online Master’s Program in Economics is on Georgia’s Local Option Sales Tax. I’ve read his thesis. It’s terrific.

Olivia Pickering is a Customer Finance Analyst with King & Prince Seafood. Olivia is taking her final course this semester and will graduate in December. She’s a sharp and imaginative thinker. A colleague recently told me, “When Olivia makes a class presentation, you’d think you were listening to a seasoned CEO.”

Being a college teacher is an extraordinary privilege. To be able to make a living reading, studying, thinking, writing and talking with people about economics, a subject that becomes more fascinating to me with each passing day, is good fortune beyond belief.

Topping off that good fortune are the marvelous people I cross paths with, the College of Coastal Georgia students who take a class or two of mine.

Whether a student likes or dislikes economics is not important to me. I look for grit and hard work.

Gritty students are a joy to teach. The joy is amplified by seeing the productive things they do after they graduate.

Justin, Maggie, James, Dylan and Olivia are unique individuals with a few things in common. They’re College of Coastal Georgia grads. They’re gritty; there’s not the slightest trace of entitlement in them. And they’re doing great work in our community.

How’s that for good news? 

A Million COVID Deaths Cause Rampant Mental Distress

1 in 8 Deaths from 2020 to 2021 in the U.S. resulted from COVID-19, behind only heart disease and cancer, according to a recent study in JAMA Internal Medicine. This amounts to over 1,000,000 deaths from the pandemic in the U.S. alone. Many of these deaths were unexpected and occurred in isolation from family. This caused a dramatic rise in bereavement. These untimely and tragic deaths put those who lost loved ones at risk of depression, mental distress, and other mental health challenges.

A wealth of peer-reviewed research is revealing the social repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic. In several related studies, a team of sociologists—Shawn Bauldry, Emily Smith-Greenaway, Rachel Margolis, Ashton Verdery, Haowei Wang, and other collaborators—conducted research that offers insight into mental health outcomes among those who lost a loved one in the pandemic. Their research, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, projects that more than nine million people in the U.S. have lost a close relative to COVID-19. They found that those left behind are vulnerable to a range of negative mental health outcomes.

The researchers show that COVID-19 deaths cause a lot of grief compared to many other types of death. COVID-19 deaths are perceived to be “bad deaths:” these deaths are often preceded by pain and distress, tend to occur in hospital settings where patients are isolated from family, and happen suddenly. The perception that these deaths were premature and untimely magnifies distress among family members left behind. The grief and distress associated with loss were exacerbated by the stress of the ongoing pandemic, long periods of social isolation, and economic precarity.

This same research team compared spousal deaths in the early COVID-19 pandemic to spousal deaths just before the pandemic in their recent article in The Journals of Gerontology. The researchers found that COVID-19 widows and widowers faced higher rates of depression, loneliness, and other mental health challenges when compared to pre-pandemic widows and widowers.

Certain groups have experienced a disproportionate share of mental health distress due to losing loved ones in the pandemic. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data show that some populations experienced higher mortality rates from COVID-19 than others. The elderly and low-income persons were more at risk of experiencing a death from COVID-19. Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans saw higher death rates in the pandemic. In addition, those residing in rural settings and those who were uninsured suffered higher mortality rates.

Many health outcomes related to COVID-19 are improving, but there are nine million left behind who are at substantial risk of health problems correlated with losing a loved one. The bereaved face mental health problems associated with their loss, including grief, depression, and mental distress. These mental health challenges can lead to declines in physical health and increase one’s risk of death.

Inequities in access to health care are at the core of why certain demographics experienced divergent mortality rates and loss of loved ones during the pandemic. Health care inequities contribute to untreated and undertreated preexisting conditions among certain demographics. Additionally, these same health care inequities shape access to mental health services for the bereaved.

As deaths directly attributed to COVID-19 wane, it is essential that we address the mental health crisis in the United States that was exacerbated by the pandemic. The nine million in the U.S. who have lost a loved one can benefit from financial, social, and mental health support. It is essential to ensure that all Americans have access to health insurance and affordable healthcare, including treatment for mental health conditions.

Roscoe Scarborough, Ph.D. is interim chair of the Department of Social Sciences and associate professor of sociology at College of Coastal Georgia. He is an associate scholar at the Reg Murphy Center for Economic and Policy Studies. He can be reached by email at rscarborough@ccga.edu.

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Intrinsic Extrinsic Motivation

This week, I do not intend to offer a policy analysis or suggestion as we often do in this column. Instead, I want to share some of my recent observations and wonderings about human behavior. As a microeconomist, I study how folks- or firms- make decisions. More specifically, I have worked primarily in the subfield of behavioral economics, sort of the intersection of psychology and economics. I love to think about the motivations behind decision-making.

As you can imagine, I have plenty of opportunities for observing interesting motivations both as an educator and as a mom. Most recently, I have thought a lot about intrinsic vs extrinsic motivation in my home and in my classroom.

Intrinsic motivation is associated with performing a task for one’s own satisfaction. Extrinsic motivation causes one to act only to obtain an external reward or avoid an external punishment.

There isn’t much space in neoclassical economic theory for intrinsic motivation. The theory is built around Homo Econimicus, a fully informed and perfectly rational human being who responds to (typically external) incentives with behaviors that are in their own self-interest.

At home, I am currently parenting a small Homo Econimicus. Every couple minutes as he plays, I hear, “Mama! Watch this!” It is not enough that his play is fun for him; he also seeks reassurance that I approve and am entertained. And often before he chooses a particular behavior, he will ask me what his reward or consequence will be for that behavior. He is almost totally driven by external incentives, and I am in the weird space of parenting where I offer extrinsic rewards or consequences in hopes that he develops a sense of the intrinsic value of certain behaviors.

And, indeed, I have hope! Sure, we are all born primarily motivated by extrinsic factors; it’s an evolutionary necessity that a baby’s cry is met with the reward of food or comfort. But, despite what neoclassical economists assume, behavioral economists find strong evidence of intrinsic motivation in adult human behavior.

I have written for this column before about economics experiments in which participants demonstrate altruistic behavior, giving to others without promise of anything in return. These experiments are often conducted under complete anonymity. Participants are totally intrinsically motivated toward altruism.

Recently, I have personally observed behavior among my students that is almost certainly indicative of intrinsic motivation among them. Upon completion of a group project, I have students rate themselves and their teammates on a scale of 1 to 4 across several dimensions of teamwork. Their individual grades for their projects depend not only on the team’s submitted materials but also on their self and peers’ evaluation of their collaborative contribution. Each student completes the ratings individually, and I am the only person who will see their responses.

Every semester, I have several students who rate themselves lower than they rate their peers, and even more surprising, who rate themselves lower than their peers rate them. This summer, for example, 6 out of 37 students (16.2%) who completed the team evaluations rated themselves lower than their teammates rated them.

I always wonder why in the world a student, knowing that their self-evaluation has potential to decrease their course grade, would rate themselves anywhere below the highest score. I ask even more questions when they rate themselves below their actual level of contribution as reported by their teammates.

I can think of a couple of reasons students might do this: 1) They are afraid of how their teammates might rate them and want me to view them as honest, or 2) They are intrinsically motivated to honestly assess their own work as part of their team.

Neoclassical economics would say the former is the most rational explanation for rating oneself lower than the maximum score. But, I am not convinced students care that much about what I think. I think something deeper, more intrinsic is going on here. And, as odd as it is to me that students behave this way, I love it. It gives me hope that my little Homo Economicus and many of his peers will evolve into intrinsically motivated, morally driven social contributors.

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Dr. Melissa Trussell is a professor in the School of Business and Public Management at College of Coastal Georgia who works with the college’s Reg Murphy Center for Economic and Policy Studies. Contact her at mtrussell@ccga.edu.

 

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Two Popular Explanations of Inflation are Wrong

The two most popular explanations of the current inflation are: “Corporate greed is to blame for inflation” and “Joe Biden is to blame for inflation.” Each explanation is simple, clear and bogus.

Consider first the corporate greed theory of inflation. The country’s first bout of inflation occurred right out of the chute, during the Revolutionary War. Economic historians estimate that from 1776 to 1780, the average annual rate of inflation in the new nation was 12 percent, including 22 percent in 1777 and 30 percent in 1778.

That’s a problem for the corporate greed theory of inflation. There were no corporations in the U.S. until after the Revolutionary War.

The giant corporation of the modern sort did not make the American scene until the 1870s, and its economy-transforming proliferation took place roughly between 1890 and 1910. Those were the years of the “robber barons,” the “gilded age.”

What was inflation like during the gilded age? It wasn’t. Price indexes constructed by economic historians indicate that prices in 1910 were 26 percent lower than they were in 1870. If inflation is caused by corporate greed, then by logic deflation is caused by corporate generosity, which would make the robber barons saints of selflessness.

Inflation ran low from 1952 to 1967, perked up a bit from 1968 to 1972, surged from 1973 to 1982, ran low from 1983 through the first half of 2021, at which time the current bout kicked in.

It thus follows from the logic of the corporate greed theory of inflation that corporations were not very greedy from 1952 to 1967, moderately greedy from 1968 to 1972, quite greedy from 1973 to 1982, not very greedy from 1983 through the first half of 2020, and quite greedy after that.

For the theory to hold, corporate greed would have to be a sporadic mood swing. Seems a bit far-fetched.

Moving on, readers of Dr. Skip Mounts’ columns in this newspaper know that the “Joe Biden did it” theory of inflation has less hunt than a headless dog. Dr. Mounts, who never shies from an uphill battle, has painstakingly explained in numerous columns that modern inflation has only one source, a country’s central bank. Our central bank is the Federal Reserve, or “Fed,” for short.

A president does not decide federal tax and spending policies. Congress does. A president can certainly influence debate over taxes and spending, but Congress calls the shots.

More to the point, government spending does not “pump money into the economy.” Government spending is paid for out of tax revenues or financed with borrowed money – proceeds from the sale of Treasury bonds. The borrowed money is not new money. It came from the investors and institutions who bought the Treasury bonds.  

Only the Federal Reserve can “pump money into the economy.” Which means only the Fed can cause inflation.

What’s missing from much of the current criticism of the Fed is context. The current inflation is the consequence of the Fed’s response to the economic collapse in the first months of the COVID pandemic. The unemployment rate went from 3.5 percent to 14.7 percent in two months, while real GDP dropped by 35 percent in three. That’s depression-size contraction. Sheer panic in money and financial markets threatened to make the situation worse.

To prevent economic calamity during the pandemic, the Fed, along with central banks across the planet, opened every money floodgate they could find. Turns out they opened a few too many.

At any rate, there is an important lesson here. Don’t fall for bogus explanations of inflation. Don’t peddle them, either.

Material Hardship Worse for Low-Income Families

Many Americans are struggling to make ends meet. Housing, gas, utilities, food, transportation, and most goods and services are more expensive than they were a year ago. Inflation in the U.S. reached 9.1% in June, the highest rate in over forty years. However, the impact of inflation is more pronounced on low-income households. These financial challenges set the stage for mental health problems and conflicts in the home.

Inflation erodes the value of real wages and savings, but these effects are not felt equally. With substantial disposable incomes, higher-income households are better equipped to absorb the rising cost of necessities. Conversely, there is little room in the already tight budgets of low-income households to cover the higher costs of essentials. Rising prices force low-income families to decide whether to buy groceries, pay the utility bill, refill a prescription, or purchase clothes for a child.

An empty checking account can cause family problems. A 2022 study published by Dr. Joyce Y. Lee and collaborators in Family Relations tested how economic insecurity contributes to mothers’ and fathers’ mental health and relationship conflicts. Specifically, this research focused on material hardship—everyday challenges related to making ends meet, including difficulties paying for housing, utilities, food, or medical care.

Lee and her research team found that it was material hardship, not low income itself, that set the stage for parental mental health problems that result in family conflicts. Material hardship impacted fathers’ mental health more than mothers’ mental health. Depressive symptoms noted among fathers included sadness, sleep problems, loneliness, and difficulty concentrating. Conflicts included putting down a partner’s feelings or opinions, blaming the partner for things that go wrong, and fights with accusations and name-calling. This sort of verbal aggression is damaging to relationships and harmful to young children who witness this behavior.

It should not be surprising that material hardship impacts families by hurting fathers’ mental health more than mothers’ mental health. Traditional gender roles pressure fathers to fulfill the breadwinner role. When fathers feel that they cannot alleviate economic stressors in their families, the outcomes are mental health problems and conflicts in the home.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, low-income households experienced high levels of unemployment, economic insecurity, and mental health problems. Now, inflation is bringing material hardship to more American households. A looming economic recession would further harm low-income families.

Access to mental health services for mothers and fathers is critical to support healthy family functioning. Tragically, health care has become a luxury. Low-income families often prioritize other essentials, including rent and food.

A range of solutions are warranted. Culturally, the U.S. must destigmatize mental illness. Additionally, all Americans need to be able to access mental health services. Health systems must be incentivized to provide mental health services in low-income rural and urban communities. Expanding telemedicine promises to increase access for folks in rural areas and those without transportation.

Expansion of Medicaid could increase access to mental health care for low-income households. At present, Georgia ranks among the bottom three states in rates of health insurance coverage. Full expansion of Medicaid offered under the Affordable Care Act would extend Medicaid eligibility to nearly all low-income individuals earning below 138% of the poverty line. This would provide insurance coverage to almost half a million more Georgians.

It is essential to pair expanded access to mental health services with institutional reforms that reduce rates of poverty and increase household income. Policies that ensure equitable access to quality public education and economic opportunities for low-income Americans are a good start.

 

Roscoe Scarborough, Ph.D. is interim chair of the Department of Social Sciences and associate professor of sociology at College of Coastal Georgia. He is an associate scholar at the Reg Murphy Center for Economic and Policy Studies. He can be reached by email at rscarborough@ccga.edu.

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Is the Sinking U.S. Birth Rate a Problem?

The sinking U.S. birth rate has a lot of people worried.

To refresh your memory, the U.S. birth rate – measured as the number of births per 1,000 women aged 15 years to 44 years – has been sinking without interruption since 2007. The most recent birth rate measure of 56.0 in 2020 is a 19.4 percent drop from the 2007 birth rate of 69.5.

The birth rate decline has been widespread across demographic groups. Percentage decreases in birth rates from 2007 to 2020 by demographic group are: 64 percent for women age 15 to 19 years, 41 percent for women age 20 to 24 years, 23 percent for women age 25 to 29 years, 5 percent for women age 30 to 34 years, 38 percent for Hispanic women, 17 percent for non-Hispanic Black women, 11.5 percent for non-Hispanic White women, 18 percent for women without a high school diploma and 18 percent for college-educated women.

The consequence of a persistently low birth rate becomes clearer with the help of another demographic measure, the total fertility rate. Adding the birth rate at each age from 15 to 44 years yields the number of births per 1,000 women through their reproductive years. Dividing that figure by 1,000 yields the total fertility rate: an estimate of the average number of children a woman will have in her lifetime.

The total fertility rate necessary for a population to replace itself from one generation to the next – that is, the total fertility rate that generates zero population growth (ignoring immigration and emigration) — is called the replacement rate. The replacement rate for wealthy countries such as the U.S. is a total fertility rate of 2.1.

In 2007, the U.S. total fertility rate was 2.1. By 2020, the U.S. total fertility rate had dropped to 1.64.

The upshot: if current birth rates persist, the U.S. population will age and ultimately shrink.  Immigration could change the picture, but that would require ditching the restrictive immigration policies put in place several years ago.

What has people worried is today’s children are tomorrow’s workers and taxpayers. Fewer worker-taxpayers constrains both economic growth and the ability of federal, state and local governments to provide public services. Especially at risk: Social Security and Medicare.

Is the worry warranted?

No. After 44 years of wallowing in economics like a hog in slop, I’ve come to regard predictions of economic crisis as the sasquatch sightings of the college-educated. It takes more brain power to concoct a tale of capitalism’s next imminent crisis than to blow out a yarn about the hairy thing you saw for certain roaming the woods last night. As for reliability, tough call.  Sasquatch sightings might have a slight edge.

Oddly enough, sustained low birth rates are more likely to increase the labor force in the future than reduce it.

Consider the 64 percent decrease in the teen birth rate. The surest route to years spent out of the labor force and in poverty is becoming a single mother as a teenager. If the current low teen birth rate persists, it will bring a sizeable drop in the poverty rate and a sizable increase in labor force participation for years to come.

Lower birth rates translate to greater labor force participation for women in their 20s and 30s, as well.

Further, labor force participation rates for people age 65 years and older having been on the rise since the late 1980s. Today, one-third of 65 to 69 year olds and one-fifth of 70 to 74 year olds are in the labor force.

Low birth rate?  Not a problem.

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U.S. Birth Rate Has Been Sinking since 2007

The U.S. birth rate has been sinking sharply since 2007 for no clear reasons.

A country’s birth rate is measured as the number of births per 1,000 women aged 15 years to 44 years.  Between 1980 and 2007, the U.S. birth rate fluctuated between 65 to 70.  In 2007, it was 69.5.

The U.S. birth rate has fallen every year since. The most recent measure of the U.S. birth rate, for 2020, is 56.0. That’s a 19.4 percent drop in 13 years.

The U.S. birth rate decline is widespread across women of different ages.

The teen birth rate – the number of births per 1,000 women age 15 to 19 years – had been falling before 2007: after peaking at 61.8 in 1991, it steadily fell to 42.5 by 2007. It has since plunged to 15.3 in 2020.

U.S. birth rates have also fallen for women in their 20s and early 30s. The birth rate for women age 20 to 24 years fell from 106.3 in 2007 to 63.0 in 2020. The birth rate for women age 25 to 29 years fell from 117.5 to 90.2. For women age 30 to 34 years, the birth rate decreased from 99.9 to 94.9.

Birth rates have increased modestly since 2007 for women age 35 to 44 years. For women age 35 to 39 years, the birth rate increased from 47.5 to 51.8; for women age 40 to 44 years, the rate increased from 9.5 to 11.8.

Those figures show two changes since 2007, one small, one big. The small change is: women are waiting longer to have children. The big change is: women are having fewer children.

U.S. birth rates have also decreased across race and ethnicity since 2007. The birth rate for Hispanic women fell from 102.2 in 2007 to 63.1 in 2020. The birth rate for non-Hispanic Black women fell from 71.6 to 59.2. The birth rate for non-Hispanic White women fell from 60.1 to 53.2.

The birth rate has also decreased across education level. The birth rate for women without a high school diploma decreased from 119.0 to 97.5. For college-educated women, the birth rate fell from 72.5 to 59.4.

What’s driving the sinking U.S. birth rate?

Potential explanations come quickly to mind. The recession of 2007-09. Better employment opportunities for women. Rising costs of raising children, including child care and housing costs. Increased use of contraceptives. College debt burdens. 

Economists have been investigating the causes of the sinking U.S. birth rate with great intensity in recent years. Their findings, to date, are clear. None of those potential explanations, nor any combination of them, explain the sinking U.S. birth rate.

Birth rates in the past fluctuated with the state of the economy, rising with expansions, falling in recessions. Thus, the 2007-09 recession might explain the first years of the sinking birth rate.  But while the economy grew without interruption from mid-2009 through February 2020, the U.S. birth rate continued to sink.

Changes in employment opportunities, child care costs, housing costs, contraceptive use and college debt burdens vary, sometimes considerably, from state to state. State-by-state comparisons show no relationship between changes those variables and changes in birth rates.

So, where does that leave us?

In a recent study, economists Melissa Kearney, Phillip Levine and Luke Pardue conjecture that changes in women’s priorities could be driving the sinking birth rate. The authors acknowledge that their “shifting priorities” explanation is speculative and probably impossible to empirically support. They offer the conjecture because economic factors fail to explain the sinking birth rate.

We’ll explore the consequences of the sinking U.S. birth rate in my next column.

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How Firearms Became the Leading Cause of Death for Children, Teens

The nation is still reeling from the school shooting in Uvalde, Texas. Mass shootings in schools are tragic. According to a recent CDC report, firearm-related injuries are the leading cause of death in the U.S. for children and teens—an all-time high. School shootings receive a lot of media coverage, but mass shootings in schools account for less than 1% of child gun deaths. This column will discuss insufficient access to mental healthcare, the availability of firearms, a spike in violent crime, and numerous other factors as causes of the recent spike in gun deaths among our youth.

Let’s overview the facts. More than 4,300 children and teens died from firearm-related injuries in 2020, surpassing motor vehicle crashes as the leading cause of death, according to the CDC. Gun deaths among children and teens rose by 29% in one year, largely due to a 33.4% increase in homicides of teens and children between 2019 and 2020. Among the entire U.S. population of all age groups, suicide constituted the majority of the 45,222 firearm-related deaths in 2020. However, among children and teens, homicides made up the majority of firearm deaths.

Mass shootings in schools are horrific, but uncommon. The overwhelming majority of firearm incidents on school property, including K-12 schools and colleges, are accidental discharges, suicides, or acts of violence targeting a single victim, according to the comprehensive list of incidents complied by the nonprofit Everytown for Gun Safety. Fortifying buildings and expanding law enforcement presence in schools may limit deaths from mass shooting events at schools, but these are outlier events. It’s important for policies to address the institutional conditions that result in the most firearm deaths among children and teens.

Many Americans assert that mass shootings are the result of untreated mental illness. Mental health declined precipitously among our youth over the course of the pandemic, in part because of the shuttering of schools and restrictions on face-to-face gatherings. We have a mental health crisis in our nation. Ensuring access to mental healthcare for children and teens plays a part in preventing gun deaths among our youth.

Gun sales have doubled in the U.S. over the past decade from 5.4 million in 2010 to 11.1 million in 2020. The availability of firearms in our nation is a central reason why the U.S. has more gun deaths than other developed nations. Reducing young people’s access to firearms is essential to reducing gun deaths among children and teens.

Attributing child gun deaths to mental illness or firearm availability alone ignores other institutional causes. A 33.4% increase in homicides of children and teens in one year is significant. Changes in law enforcement practices can reduce the number of young people who die from homicides.

Other factors contribute to child gun deaths, including the sale of firearms to persons under 21, unsecured firearms in homes, the proliferation of ghost guns, a lack of firearm safety training, the absence of red flag laws, gang violence, and violence in the home. Additional institutional conditions increase child gun deaths, including bullying, a lack of suicide prevention training, social problems associated with poverty, disengaged parents, mass and social media sensationalizing violence, and alienation among the youth.

A range of institutional reforms are warranted, but these changes cannot just focus on school security as less than 1% of child gun deaths occur in schools. It is important that our solutions address the various institutional conditions that have made firearm injuries the leading cause of death for children and teens in the U.S. Every child’s death is a tragedy, especially since these deaths are preventable.

Roscoe Scarborough, Ph.D. is an assistant professor of sociology at College of Coastal Georgia and an associate scholar at the Reg Murphy Center. He can be reached by email at rscarborough@ccga.edu.

The lost economic opportunity of abortion

By now, we all are aware of the leaked Supreme Court decision that, should it stand, will reverse Roe vs Wade and allow states to restrict or outlaw abortion. When asked about the forthcoming decision, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen replied that abortion is an economic issue. I could not agree more with that statement. Yellen went on to cite research showing improved education and labor market outcomes among women, especially minority women, who have access to abortion services.

Though I have great respect for Secretary Yellen as one of my professional heroes, I believe her conclusion that legalized abortion is a necessary part of a strong economy is based in a literature that is one-sided in its approach to the economics of abortion.

After reading Yellen’s remarks, I did some digging of my own. My primary goal was better to understand the economic costs and benefits of abortion, and I specifically was concerned with social, not individual, costs and benefits. Unsurprisingly, with a topic as complex as abortion, there is not clear consensus in the literature on the precise economic impact of abortion.

A couple of themes emerge pretty strongly. 1) As Secretary Yellen asserted, availability of unrestricted abortion reduces fertility and increases educational attainment and labor market participation of women. 2) The financial benefits to taxpayers of funding safe abortions far outweigh the costs of post-abortion care when safe abortion is not accessible.

Indeed, authors of a 2021 peer-reviewed publication found, “On average, the cost of meeting a woman’s unmet need for modern contraceptive supplies and services for one year would amount to just 3 to 12 percent of the average cost of treating a patient who requires post-abortion care.”

What I find missing from most of the literature and from Dr. Yellen’s assessment of the economics of abortion is a whole other side of the story here—the value to the economy of the lives lost when women choose abortion over birth. Most aborted pregnancies could otherwise have ended with a birth. And, given a couple of decades, most births translate into societal contributors and labor force participants.

A 2009 study found that a birth reduces a woman’s labor supply by almost 2 years, but the same study showed that removing abortion restrictions significantly reduces fertility. Productivity lost to abortion in the last half century in the US is non-trivial, especially in light of the Murphy Center’s recent series of columns on our aging labor force.

Surveys administered by the Guttmacher Institute and data from the State of Florida, where a reason is recorded for every abortion, indicate that less than 10% of abortions are performed due to health problems of the fetus or the mother. If we assume, then, that 90% of the 225,075 abortions performed in Georgia from 1990 through 1995 could have instead resulted in a birth, and if we assume the current labor force participation rate of 62.7%, these abortions could have translated to over 127,000 labor force participants between the ages of 27 and 32 today. Those folks would be consumers and tax payers, too!

To reach a conclusion on whether or not abortion restrictions are good economic policy would require far more study than is feasible in this format, but I suspect the scales would tip in favor of growing our future labor force through restricted access to abortion. This is especially true if the economic hardship women avoid through abortion were made less severe through sensible, family-friendly workplace and public policies, especially those specifically targeted to empower minority and low-income women, who are more likely than others to seek abortions.

Of course, when offering abortion policy analysis, there are many complexities to consider from many angles. But, an economic analysis that does not consider the opportunity cost of abortion is an incomplete analysis. It is irresponsible for any academic to advise on policy without having considered both benefits and costs of their recommendations. In particular, one of the primary contributions of economists to any conversation is opportunity cost analysis. In the abortion debate, my profession is getting wrapped up in political opinions and failing to do what we do best. I’m disappointed.

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Dr. Melissa Trussell is a professor in the School of Business and Public Management at College of Coastal Georgia who works with the college’s Reg Murphy Center for Economic and Policy Studies. Contact her at mtrussell@ccga.edu.

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Another Reason Workers Are Hard to Find

Talk to people in the leisure and hospitality industry, and they’ll tell you the shrinking population of young people is not the only reason for the on-going worker shortages. An abrupt decrease in immigration is another.

People in the leisure and hospitality industry should know. In no other industry is the worker shortage as acute.

The leisure and hospitality industry is a massive collection of industries. It consists of two subsectors, one being arts, entertainment and recreation; the other, accommodation and food service. Arts, entertainment and recreation includes performing arts, spectator sports, museums, zoos, fitness centers and golf courses. Accommodation and food service includes hotels, restaurants, bars and a plethora of the like.

Prior to the pandemic, leisure and hospitality ranked third among the nation’s leading private sector employers (behind professional and business services, and education and health services). It employed 17 million people, 10.7 percent of employed U.S. workers. Accommodation and food services employed 14.5 million; arts, entertainment and recreation, 2.5 million.

In Glynn, leisure and hospitality is a monster industry, far and away the county’s leading employer. Just before the pandemic, leisure and hospitality employed about 8,500 Glynn workers, 22 percent of the county’s employed workers. Accommodation and food services employed about 7,350; arts, entertainment and recreation employed about 1,150.

The pandemic hit leisure and hospitality harder than any other industry. Nationally, the industry’s recovery from the pandemic has been impressive, but not complete. U.S. leisure and hospitality employment currently stands at 15.5 million, 1.5 million below its pre-pandemic level.

In Glynn, leisure and hospitality’s recovery has been impressive and probably complete. The most recent industry employment figure for Glynn is 8,243 for the third quarter of 2021. But tourism here has been roaring for months. A current employment figure below 8,500 would be surprising.

Lurking beneath those numbers is a detail that explains why the worker shortage in leisure and hospitality is so acute. Leisure and hospitality relies heavily on two sets of workers: young workers and immigrants.

The median age of a worker in the U.S. is 42.2 years. The median age of a leisure and hospitality worker in the U.S. is 31.7 years. In the U.S., 12 percent of employed workers are age 16 to 24 years. In leisure and hospitality, 35 percent of employed workers are age 16 to 24 years.

The problem? Between 2010 and 2019, the population of 16 to 24 years olds in the U.S. shrunk by 843,029. The population under age 16 shrunk by 876,772.

In the U.S., 17 percent of employed workers are immigrants. In leisure and hospitality, the figure is 20 percent. In accommodation, it’s 32 percent.

The problem? Between 2000 and 2017, the U.S. foreign-born population increased by an average of 743,000 per year. Between 2017 and 2019, the average increase fell to 203,000 per year. With the pandemic, the U.S. foreign-born population appears to have decreased (though official figures for 2020 and 2021 are not yet available).

To the point, the abrupt shift in immigration in 2018 and 2019 from the 2000-2017 trend cost the U.S. about 1.1 million workers, half of whom would have been college educated.

Would an additional 1.1 million workers solve our current worker shortage problem? No. But it would take a nice chunk out of it.

The new trend in immigration is old news to people in the leisure and hospitality industry, especially hoteliers. The industry has been lobbying hard for immigration reform since 2018.

How’s that for a predicament? The population of young workers can’t be unshrunk. And immigration reform requires serious people in politics.

Look for leisure and hospitality to become the leading employer of robotics engineers.